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CRIMINAL LAW-JURISDICTION-ILLEGAL ARREST-DUE PROCESS-VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.-In the absence of
universal criminal jurisdiction, it is well established that only the
state whose criminal law has been violated' may try the person
accused of the violation. If the accused has sought refuge abroad,
he must be brought within the state in which he is to stand trial
in order to give the appropriate court of this state jurisdiction over
his person . His presence may be secured lawfully by way of
extradition or, unlawfully, by kidnapping him in the state of
refuge, or by enticing him to come into the state of prosecution
by fraud, deception or trickery, rather than force .
Will the accused be able successfully to resist any attempt to
prosecute him on the ground that his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court has been illegally obtained?
Kidnapping may involve a violation of customary or conventional international law when officials of the prosecuting state
or private persons at the instigation of such officials perpetrated
it. In this case, the kidnapping of the accused constitutes a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the state of refuge. A violation of international law may also occur where the accused has
been seized in breach of a treaty of extradition.
In Canada, the courts seem to be of the opinion that an
accused cannot succeed in escaping justice because he was
brought to trial against his will . This practice has its source in
the Roman law maxim Mala captus bene detentits. On the other
hand, in the United States of America, some courts have begun
to adopt a different opinion on this question .
In Re Hartnett and The Queen; Re Hudson and The Queen,
the applicants who resided in the United States of America sought,
by way of certiorari, to quash their committal for trial on charges
of fraud. The informations had been laid by an investigator with
the Ontario Securities Commission in January, 1973, after an
investigation which had begun in 1972. The applicant Hudson
who had voluntarily appeared before the Commission on two
previous occasions and the applicant Hartnett had been asked
to appear again before the Commission to give evidence under
oath in January, 1973 . They journeyed from Dallas, Texas, to
Toronto, but were arrested before they could attend the hearing .
The applicants took the position that they were enticed into
I In Canada jurisdiction over offences is mostly based on the territorial
principle. See ss . 5(2) and 6 of the Criminal Code, R.S .C ., 1970, c. C-34,
as am . Jurisdiction generally means the capacity of a state under international law to make or to enforce a rule of law.
2 [19741 1 O.R . (2d) 206.
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Canada on the pretence that the further assistance of Hudson and
the additional assistance of Hartne.tt were required by the Ontario
Securities Commission when the real purpose of the Commission
staff was to have them arrested. They argued that in a civil
proceeding service of a writ effected in this way would be set
aside, and that for the purposes of the criminal law, what had
happened amounted to denying them that "due process of law"
which Canadian subjects and the subjects or citizens of any other
state to whom the laws of Canada applied, were guaranteed by
section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights which states : 3
1 . It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason
of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human
rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, (a) the right of the individual
to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and
the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law ;
The process of law owed to them included the right to have extradition proceedings taken against them in the United States of
America . Failure to take such proceedings denied them this right
as well as natural justice and in consequence the Provincial Court
judge had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary hearing on
the charges which were laid against them in Canada .
The Ontario High Court dismissed the applications on the
ground that the method used in bringing an accused to Canada
does not affect the jurisdiction of the judge to conduct the preliminary hearing.
There was no denial of "due process of law". The court
relied on the Supreme Court decision in Curr v. The Queen' where
Mr. Justice Ritchie stated that the "meaning to be given to the
language employed in the Bill of Rights is the meaning which it
bore in Canada at the time when the Bill was enacted, and it
follows that, in my opinion, the phrase `due process of law' as used
in s. 1(a) is to be construed as meaning `according . to the legal
processes recognized by Parliament and the courts in Canada'".5
In that case Mr. Justice Laskin made an extensive review of
the meaning of "due process of law" in which he referred to the
origins of the phrase and its application in decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. However, he declined to take the phrase
1960, c. 44, now R.S.C., 1970, App. III. '
[19721 S.C.R. 889, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181 .
Ibid., at pp. 916 (S.C.R.), . 185 (C.C.C.) For earlier cases see S. M.
Beck, Electronic Surveillance and the Administration of Criminal Justice
(1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 643, at p. 659 et seq.. The purpose of the Bill of
Rights is to make existing rights more enforceable . It does not create new
rights. Still a right exists even though it is often violated.
3 S .C .,
4
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"except by due process of law" beyond its antecedents in English
legal history in order to view it in terms that have had sanction in
the United States of America, ". . . in the consideration there of
those parts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the American Constitution that forbid the federal and state authorities
respectively to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law".6 Section 1(a) essentially points to procedural considerations . As his Lordship said : "I am unable to
appreciate what more can be read into s . 1(a) from a procedural
standpoint than is already comprehended by s . 2(e) (`a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice' ) and
by s. 2(f) (`a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal')" .-, In other words, section 1(a) would seem to
refer to procedural regularity or procedural fairness in the criminal
courts and not to the manner in which the accused is brought before these courts .
Although Mr. Justice Laskin stated that the Crown conceded
that section 1(a) could have application to pre-trial matters affecting the person who is about to be charged with an offence, this
issue was not pursued ." Nor did the High Court of Ontario in the
Hartnett case accept Mr. Justice Martland's invitation in Curr to
expand the law when he said: "I do not adopt as final, any specific
definition of the phrase `due process of law' as used in s. 1(a) of
the Canadian Bill of Rights."
The Ontario High Court merely applied R. v. Isbell"' where
it was held that an illegal arrest does not deprive the judge of
jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution of the accused . The court
pointed out that although this case was decided before the enact1; Ibid .,
7 Ibid.

at pp . 896 (S .C .R .), 190 (C .C.C .) .

Pre-trial police misconduct that would be prohibited is that which
would tend to convict an innocent man, such as an illegally obtained
confession .
'' Ibid ., at pp . 914 (S .C .R .), 184 (C.C .C .) . Note that Hartnett is not a
case where the infringement of the Bill of Rights would render a federal
enactment inoperative . All that is needed is for the courts and the police to
exercise their powers in accordance with s. 1(a) of the Bill of Rights . For
support by analogy see Laskin J. in Brmrnridge v. R., [1972] S.C.R . 926,
at pp . 954-955.
10 (1928), 63 O .L .R . 384, 51 C.C.C . 362, [1929] 2 D.L .R . 732. This
view implies a literal interpretation of s. 428(a) of the Criminal Code,
supra, footnote 1, which provides that ". . . every superior court of criminal
jurisdiction and every court of criminal jurisdiction that has power to try
an indictable offence is competent to try an accused for that offence (a) if
the accused is found, is arrested or is in custody within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court;" .
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ment of the Bill of Rights, it was still good authority since the
arrest of the applicants was not unlawful in its domestic aspects
and all they were complaining of was that, by virtue of such arrest,
they had been denied the right to be heard in extradition proceedings, a circumstance which; in the view of the court, did not invalidate the process, although it may have constituted a violation of
the United States-Canada Extradition Treaty .
The Ontario High Court also refused to apply by analogy
the well-settled rule applicable to civil proceedings that where a
non-resident defendant is enticed into the state by the fraud of the
plaintiff, the court will not exercise jurisdiction over him" on the
ground that : "Analogy may be useful and persuasive but it cannot
be used to make law. . . ."1=
By contrast, in the United States of America, the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a remarkable opinion,
came to the conclusion that the requirement of due process, as
understood in that country, requires the criminal court to divest
itself of jurisdiction over the accused where it has been acquired
as a result of the illegal conduct of law enforcement authorities .
Such conduct debases the processes of justice and cannot be
ignored by the court.
In United States v. Toscanino, 13 the accused, an Italian
citizen, was appealing from a conviction in the Eastern District
Court of New York for conspiracy to import and distribute narcot
ics . He contended that the court had acquired jurisdiction over
him unlawfully through the conduct of American agents who kidnapped him in Uruguay with the connivance of the United States
Government, used illegal electronic surveillance, tortured him and
abducted him via Brazil to the United States to prosecute him
there.
The accused did not question the sufficiency of the evidence
against him, nor did he claim any error as regards the trial itself .
His argument both prior to the trial and after the verdict of the
jury was returned, was that the proceedings in the District Court
were void because his presence within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court had been illegally obtained. At no time had the United
States formally or informally requested the Government of
Uruguay to extradite him . No effort was made to proceed through
legal channels, but rather the whole operation was conducted willfully and unlawfully, violating the domestic laws of three separate
(1923), 53 O.L.R . 608, at p. 609, per Riddell J.
1-' Supra, footnote 2, at p. 210.
13 (1974), 500 F. 2d 267 (2nd Cir .) . Re-hearing denied (Oct . 8th,
1974), 43 U.S .L .W. 2175 .
11 Lewis v. Wiley
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countries, as well as treaties to which the United States was a party .
The government prosecutor neither affirmed nor denied these allegations but claimed that they were immaterial to the District
Court's power to proceed .
The Court of Appeals considered whether a federal court
must assume jurisdiction over an accused who is illegally apprehended abroad and forcibly abducted by government agents to the
United States for the purpose of facing criminal charges . Under the
so-called Ker-Frisbie rule'14 which resulted from two decisions of
the United States Supreme Court that have laid the foundations of
cases of this nature, "due process of law is satisfied when one
present in court is convicted of crime after being fairly apprized
of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards",' , regardless of the manner
in which jurisdiction was obtained over the accused. However,
later on, the United States Supreme Court widened its interpretation of the doctrine of due process to bar the government from
realizing the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in bringing the accused to trial"' while other courts and writers', criticized the Ker-Frisbie rule : The requirement of due process must extend to the pre-trial conduct of law enforcement
authorities. Today, these two cases can no longer be reconciled
with the principle expressed in Wong Sun v. United States" that
the government should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal actions . Having unlawfully seized a person in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, which guarantees "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures",
the government should as a matter of fundamental fairness be
obliged to return him to his previous status.''
14 See Ker v . Illinois (1886), 119 U.S. 436, 72 S. Ct 225, 30 L, Ed . 421,
and Frisbie v . Collins (1952) . 342 U.S . 509, 72 S. Ct 519, 96 L. Ed . 541 .
For an earlier case see United States v . Insull (1934), 8 F. Supp. 310 (N .D .
111.) .
15 Frisbie v . Collins, ibid ., at p. 522 (U .S .) .
16 See Wong Sam v . United States (1963), 371 U.S . 471, 81
S. Ct 407,
9 L. Ed . 2d 441 . Also Rochin v . California (1952), 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.
Ct 205 ; Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S . 643. 81 S. Ct 1684 .
1 , E.g ., United States v . Edmons (1970), 432 F. 2d 577, at p. 583 (2nd
Cir.) ; R. M. Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and
Shepardized (1968), 56 Cal. L. Rev. 579, at p. 600; A. W. Scott, Criminal
Jurisdiction of a State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by
Force or Fraud (1953), 37 Minn . L. Rev . 91, at pp . 102, 107.
18 Supra, footnote 16 .
1`.a Compare the power of the federal courts in the civil context to decline
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose presence has been secured
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In Toscanino, the court pointed out that the accused was
abducted by federal agents in contravention of the provisions of
the Charters of the United Nations='" and of the Organization of
American States-" which were binding upon the United States and
Uruguay. Since in these international treaties the United States had
agreed not to violate the territorial integrity of Uruguay but had
broken this obligation by abducting Toscanino, the allegations
made against the government were not governed by Ker where no
treaty obligation had been found to be broken. The relevant
authority was Cook v. United States '22 where it was held that the
court had no jurisdiction since, under a treaty between the United
States and Britain, forcible seizure was incapable of giving .that
court power to adjudicate title to a vessel regardless of its physical
presence within the jurisdiction .
The Toscanino case constitutes a new logical expansion of the
notion of due process in the United States of America .''3 It also
by fraud. See in re Johnson (1896), 167 U.S . 120, at, p. 126, 17 S. Ct
735, 42 L. Ed . 103; Fitzgerald Construction Co . v. Fitzgerald (1890), 137
U.S . 98, 11 S. Ct 36, 34 L. Ed . 608.
-'0 See the Charter of the United Nations, art. 2, par. 4, which obligates
"All Members" to "refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . ." .
_i See O.A .S . Charter, art. 20, which provides that the "territory of a
state is inviolable ; it may not be the object, even temporarily. . . . of . . .
measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever . . ." .
-' (1933), 288 U.S . 102, esp. at p. 121, 53 S. Ct 305. On this point see
also Ford v. United States (1927), 273 U.S . 593, at pp . 605-606, 47 S. Ct
531, 71 L. Ed . 793.
23 The court's conclusion in Toscanino was that the case should be
remanded for further proceedings, not inconsistent with the opinion given.
Should Toscanino provide evidentiary credible supporting evidence, that the
action was taken by or at the discretion of United States officials, an
evidentiary hearing would have to be held . Toscanino was partly distinguished in United States v. Herrera (1974), 504 F. 2d 859 (5th Cir.) and the
Ker-Frisbie rule reaffirmed . In United States ex . rel. Lujan v, Gengler
(1975), 510 F. 2d 62 (2nd Cir.), the court distinguished and explained
Toscanino, its own previous decision, on the ground that the abduction of
a suspect from another country violates international law only when the
offended state objects to that conduct. Toscanino had offered to prove that
the Uruguayan government had condemned his apprehension as alien to its
laws whereas Lujan had failed to allege that Argentina or Bolivia protested
his abduction. A careful reading of Toscanino does not seem to bear this
out. From an international law point of view, the decisive factor seemed to
have been the violation of two treaties by the United States rather than any
protest by the countries involved . Also in Lujan the court held that the
absence of any contention that the accused was subjected to torture, terror
or custodial interrogation of any kind did not constitute a violation of due
process which would require the federal courts to divest themselves of jurisdiction over him. Thus, Toscanino was, not applicable. In footnote 9, at p. 68,
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emphasizes the fact that in that country an accused may successfully raise the question of violation of international law in the
domestic courts .
When an accused is kidnapped in the state of refuge and
forcibly brought within the jurisdiction by agents of the prosecuting
government, he may obtain his freedom as the violation of the
sovereignty of the foreign state engages the responsibility of the
state of arrest, provided the state of refuge complains that his
abduction was in violation of international law and requests his
return . This would also be the case where the provisions of a valid
extradition treaty in force between the state of refuge and the
state of arrest have been ignored or violated, as for instance where
the demanding state after receiving the fugitive tried him for a
crime other than that for which he was extradited .-" When the
extradition treaty has deliberately been ignored by both states, it
would be more difficult for the accused himself to invoke a violation of international law . The merit of Toscanino is clearly to point
out that a violation of international law is not merely a political
matter to be settled through diplomatic channels by the states
involved!-'--, but can also be relied upon by the accused in the
domestic courts . Not only has the territorial state a claim against
the court pointed out that unlike the exclusionary rule which prohibits use
of illegally obtained evidence or confessions, the adoption of an exclusionary
rule here would confer a total immunity to criminal prosecution . This did
not seem to be favoured by the court which pointed out that since there
was probable cause for Lujan's arrest and since the failure of Argentina
or Bolivia to object suggested they would have been receptive to his extradition, the extreme remedy of requiring dismissal of the indictment was not
necessary. The court did not reject Toscanino in its entirety . Government agents do not have a carte blanche to bring defendants from abroad
to the United States by the use of torture, brutality and similar outrageous
conduct . However, any irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's
arrival in the jurisdiction does not always vitiate the proceedings of the
criminal court. A simple abduction is not necessarily a violation of due
process.
-4 United States v. Rauscher (1888), 119 U.S . 407, 7 S. Ct 234. In Canada
see J .G . Castel, S. Williams, International Criminal Law (1st ed ., 1974),
p. 557 et seq. Note that an illegal arrest could constitute a serious violation
of an internationally protected human right under the Charter of the United
Nations (art . 55(i) ), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (arts 3,
9, 10), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (arts 9,
12, 13) to the extent that these are part of the law of Canada and
therefore enforceable in our country. See also W. 1 . Brennan Jr ., International Due Process and the Law (1962), 48 Va . L. Rev. 1258 .
- See State v. Brewster (1835), 7 Vt . 118; United States v . Unverzagt
(1924), 299 F. 1015 (D .C .), (1919-42), 11 Annual Digest (Supplementary
Vol.), Case No. 53, p. 101 . In the case of violation of a treaty, appeal must
be made to the executive branches of the treaty governments for redress.
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the arresting state under international law but the accused has a
defense based upon the arrest in violation of customary or conventional international law. This is the law in the United States
especially in the case of violation of a treaty which is part of the
law of the land. In Canada the same rule should prevail under the
common law doctrine of incorporation and, in the case of a treaty,
if it has been implemented by legislation when this is necessary .-"',
When Eichmann21 was kidnapped in Argentina by a group of
Israelis who took him back to Israel to stand trial for the murder
of more than six million Jews, it was recognized that it is a
principle of international law that kidnapping of a person on the
territory of a state by foreign agents is an infringement of that
state's sovereignty and prima facie a breach of international law.
There is an obligation on the part of the state of arrest to restore
the accused to the state of refuge and to punish or extradite the
offending agents, provided the injured state makes a diplomatic
reclamation to that effect. 2 s The same appears to be true when the
accused has been induced by fraud to leave the state of refuge by
individuals acting with the complicity of agents of the arresting
state.-'s No such international obligation exists when the kidnapping or the enticement was the act of a private person without
official complicity on the side of the prosecuting state. Obviously,
26 See J.G. Castel, International. Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied
in Canada (1965), Ch. Il. Professor M. C. Bassiouni, in Unlawful Seizures
and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition (1973), 7
Vanderbilt J. of Transnational L. 25; at p. 27 points out that: "Aside from
the flagrant violation of the individual's human rights, these practices affect
the stability of international relations and subvert the international legal
process ." See also M. H. Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the
Solution? (1961), 55 Am. J. Int . L. 127; A. E. Evans, Acquisition of
Custody over the International Fugitive Offender -Alternatives to Extradition : A Survey of United States Practice (1964), 40 Br. YrBk Int. L. 77.
27 The A . G . of the Government of Israel v . Eichmann . Criminal Case
No. 40/61 (1961), 36 I.L.R. 5, aff'd (1961), 36 I.L .R. 277 . It was assumed
that the kidnappers were acting on behalf or with the tacit approval of the
State of Israel.
28 See L. Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory (1935), 29 Am. J. Int . L. 502 who gives some examples; also E. D.
Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law (1934), 28 Am. J. Int . L. 23 1; T. H. Sponsler, International
Kidnapping (1971), 5 Int . L. 27. In 1974, the U.S. government returned to
Canada an American draft evader, resident in British Columbia, who had
been illegally arrested within a few feet of the Canadian border as he was
attempting to enter the State of Washington. For other recent incidents
involving Canadians, see C. V. Cole, Extradition Treaties Abound But
Unlawful Seizures Continue, International Perspectives. March-April 1975,
p. 40.
29 However, see Ex parte Brown (1886), 28 F. 653 (le1 .D .N .Y.) and
Ex parte Ponzi (1926), 106 Tex . Crim. 58.
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too, there is no obligation to release the accused when officials of
the state of refuge participated in the irregular arrest. 3n
In the past, British and American courts have been reluctant
to hold that a violation of international law is a defence which
may be invoked by the accused ."' Thus, in Eichtnann, 32 the ac
cused could not question the jurisdiction obtained by the Israeli
courts . It was a matter between the states involved .
The problem of whether an individual can be a subject of
international law depends on the given situation and the relevant
applicable international instrument. This instrument may make
him a subject but without procedural capacity or it may do both. ; '
Argentina could have officially contested the apprehension of
Eichmann on her soil but not on behalf of the individual.3 } Argentina accepted Israel's apology and did not assert her sovereign
rights by demanding the restitution to her territory of the accused .
Thus Eichmann could not benefit from the violation of Argentina's sovereignty . Germany (or Austria) as the state where the
accused served as an official or of which he was a national, could
also have protested . Eichmann's only claim could have been a
civil one against his Israeli abductors . The fact that the United
Nations requested Argentina to accept Israel's apology in order
for Eichmann to be tried seems to indicate that, with respect to
international crimes, kidnapping does not affect the jurisdiction
.--,
of the court over the person of the accused
In United States v. Sobell"'! it was held that the fact that the
defendant had been forcibly returned to United States authorities
by the Mexican security police did not impair the power of the fed
eral District Court to try him for espionage conspiracy . Sobell did
not make a pre-trial motion challenging the jurisdiction and the
court held that this precluded the assertion of such a matter by
Sararkar Care (1911 ), Scott Hague Court Reports (1916), 275.
For a survey see P. O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition (1960) . 36 Brit . YrBk Int. L. 279, at p. 302; M. R. Garcia-Morn,
Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from Foreign
Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study (1957), 32 Ind. L. J .
427. Se e also Restatement of the Law Second, Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (1965), s. 8, comment f.
'3- Supra, footnote 27 .
; H . Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations (1948), 64 L. Q.
Rev . 97 .
P. Cutler, The Eichmann Trial ( 1961) . 4 Can. Bar J . 352 .
:. E. Heazlett, The Kidnapping of Eichmann (1962), 24 U . Pitt . L. Rev.
116.
(1957), 244 F. 2d 520 (2nd Cir.), cent . den. (1957), 355 U .S. 873,
78 S. Ct 120, re-hearing denied (1958 ), 335, U .S . 926.
30

:11

: .*3

:34

36
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motion in 'arrest of judgment.37 He did, however, raise the matter
in later appealsis and, relying on Cook,;`' argued that his kidnapping violated-the ]Extradition Treaty with Mexico and since that
treaty was the law of the land its violation deprived the United
States courts of jurisdiction over the offence with which he was
charged. He contended that his "objection to national and consequently, judicial power [did] not rest on. the kidnapping or abduction . . but rather upon the violation of the treaty" .4° The court
did not
. find any violation of the Extradition Treaty, with Mexico
and applied the rule in Ker v. Illinois41 that the-power of a court to
try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he has been
brought into the jurisdiction of the court by a forcible abduction,
provided he was physically present at the time of the trial.
In United States v. Toscanino, 12 the Court of Appeals, in
fact, rejected the authority of Ker}t and Frisbie44 on the ground
that they had been eroded by subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States .
Since for years the Ker-Frisbie rule has resisted attacks based on -the extradition clause in'the United States Constitut'ion, 45
the federal Kidnapping Act46 and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is doubtful whether the Supreme
Court of the United States will approve the reasoning of the
federal Court of Appeals in Toscanino4""
In Ker v. Illinois}r the court stated that seizure by United
States officials of fugitive criminals on the territory of a state with
whom the United States has an extradition treaty is not ipso facto
a breach of that treaty. In that case the defendant was indicted
for embezzlement and larceny by an Illinois grand jury while he
was residing in Peru . The President on the request of the Governor of Illinois invoked the Extradition Treaty between the United
United States v. Rosenberg (1952), 195 F. 2d 583 (2nd Cir.) .
Supra, footnote 36 .
39 Supra, footnote 22 .
ao Supra, footnote 36, at p. 524.
41 Supra, footnote 14 .
}-' Supra, footnote 13 .
}3 Supra, footnote 14 .
}} Ibid .
-45> Art. IV § 2, cl . 2 and 18 U.S.C . § 3182 (1948) .
46 18 U.S .C . § 1201 (1948) .
4(3a In Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 95 S. Ct 854, at p. 865, the U .S . Supreme Court stated : "Nor do we retreat from the established rule that
illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction", and cited
Ker and Frisbie.
47 Supra, footnote 14 and see Effect of Illegal Abduction into the
Jurisdiction on a Subsequent Conviction (1952), 27 Ind. L. 7. 292, at p. 294.
37
38

414

THE CANADIAN

BAR REVIEW

[VOL . LIII

States and Peru and issued a warrant to a Pinkerton agent to
receive the fugitive from the Peruvian authorities. The agent
never served the warrant, nor did he make any requests to the
Peruvians for Ker's surrender to him, but rather he forcibly arrested Ker, placed him aboard an American ship and kept him
in detention until the ship reached California . From there he was
delivered to the State of Illinois . The Supreme Court stated that
the "due process of law" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is complied with when the party is regularly indicted by the
proper grand jury in the state court, has a trial according to the
forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when in that
trial and proceedings, he is not deprived of any rights to which
he is lawfully entitled . The court held that Ker's irregular arrest
did not deny him any right under the constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States and that as an individual he possessed no
right of asylum in Peru.48
The Supreme Court faced this same question sixty-six years
later in Frisbie v. Collins4 " where a prisoner from the State, of
Michigan, on habeas corpus, alleged that he had been abducted
from Illinois to Michigan by Michigan police officers . He claimed
that his conviction in Michigan violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the federal Kidnapping
Act, and was therefore null and void . The Supreme Court rejected
his claim basing its decision on Ker .

This court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois. 119 U.S . 436, 444, that the power of a court to try a person
is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by means of a "forcible abduction". No persuasive reasons
are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest
on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present
in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the
charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards .5 '>

In other cases the same pattern was adhered to. In United
States ex rel . Voigi v . Toombs"' it was held, following Ker, that
jurisdiction once acquired in a criminal case is not impaired by
4s Preuss, op . cit., footnote 28, at p. 502 . See also Fairman, Ker v.
Illinois Revisted (1953), 47 Am . J. Int. L. 678. In United States v. Caramian (1972), 468 F. 2d 1370 (5th Cir.), the court applied Ker and stated
that even if no extradiction hearing had been conducted in the state of
refuge, this fact would not affect the jurisdiction of the court to try the
accused on the charges pending against him. See also United States v.
Herrera, supra, footnote 23, and United States v. Winter (1975), 509 F.
2d 975 (5th Cir.) .
}9 Supra, footnote 14 .
50 Ibid ., at p. 522.
si (1933), 67 F. 2d 744 (5th Cir.) .
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the manner in which the accused is brought before the court. In
Stamphill v. Johnson'-' it was concluded that the personal presence of a defendant before a District Court gives that court
complete jurisdiction over him, "regardless of how his presence
was secured, whether by premature arrest . : . wrongful seizure
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court . . . false arrest . . .
or extradition arising out of an offence other than the one for
which he is being tried",:'-' and the court cannot decline to exercise jurisdiction . In United States v. Vicarsr'} it was held that
even if, as the defendant claimed, he was illegally arrested in the
Panama Canal Zone and brought to the United States, this was
not a ground for requiring that the trial court should release and
discharge him without trial. The mast recent case decided prior to
Toscanino was United States v. Cotten and Roberts.r'"' There it
was conceded that the appellants, who were convicted of conspiracy and theft of government property, had been kidnapped or
forcibly removed from the Republic of Vietnam to the' territorial
limits of the United States by the order of government personnel .
The court held that this . fact did not preclude assertion of jurisdiction over their persons. To the court the Ker principles remained firm . Although the court recognized that the doctrine had
been criticized and that its validity may be questioned, it felt
that recent legislation and constitutional protections enunciated
in the last decade provided viable alternative protection against
undisciplined law enforcement activities . r''i
The confusion which has arisen from the Ker decision can
be traced back -to two English cases, R. v. Sattler 51 and Ex parte
Susannah Scott---,8 on which Ker was founded . Ex parse Susannah
Scott is the earliest case in which the irregular apprehension of an
accused abroad and its effect on the jurisdiction of the court
was considered. The accused was arrested in Brussels by a British
police officer, who had a warrant for her arrest on a charge of
perjury. She was forcibly brought back to England to stand trial
and raised the alleged illegality . Lord Tenterden C. J . held that
the court could not inquire into the circumstances under which
rz (1943), 136 F. 2d 291 (9th Cir.) .
53 Ibid., at p. 292.
rb} (1972), 467 F. 2d 452 (5th Cir.), cert . den. (1973), 410 U.S . 967.
5 5 (1973), 471 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir.) .
sc Ibid ., at p. 748, See also United States v. Carainian, supra, footnote 48 .
In the Cotten case, the forcible abduction of the accused did not violaie
international law as he had been voluntarily turned over to United States
representatives by the, South Vietnamese authorities.
r,7 (1858), 1 D. and B. 539, 169 E.R . 1111 .
s8 (1829), 9 B. and C. 446, 109 E.R. 166 .
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she was brought into the jurisdiction .'," In R. v. Sattler the accused committed a felony in England and subsequently fled to Hamburg, where he was arrested by an English detective with the help
of the local police . The detective had no warrant and there was
no extradition treaty between Hamburg and Britain . On the
voyage Sattler shot the detective who later died. It was held that
offences commited by foreigners on British vessels on the high
seas may be tried by any court within whose jurisdiction the offender is found and that the court did not thus have to decide on
the illegality of the original arrest .
As the legal reasoning upon which these two decisions are
based is rather unconvincing, it is surprising that the United States
courts were so ready to follow them as "authorities of the highest
respectability" ."" English courts have, however, continued to follow the pattern that possession of the offender gives jurisdiction
and forcible arrest or abduction does not impair that jurisdiction.
In R . v. Officer Commanding Depot Battalion R.A .S.C. Colchester, Ex parte Elliot'" a deserter was arrested at Antwerp by
British officers accompanied by two Belgian police officers . He
contended that his arrest and subsequent detention by the military
authorities was illegal because the British officers had no authority to arrest him in Belgium and he was arrested contrary to Belgian law . The court held that if a person is arrested abroad and
brought before a British court charged with an offence which that
court has jurisdiction to hear, the court has no power to go into
the circumstances of the arrest once the person is in lawful custody in Britain, but has jurisdiction to try him for the offence in
question .
In the case of R . v. Hughes's- the accused, a police constable,
procured a warrant to be illegally issued, without written information or oath for the arrest of one Stanley, on a charge of "assault
ing and obstructing" the police officer "in the discharge of his
duty". Upon this warrant Stanley was arrested, tried and convicted. Hughes was later tried for perjury committed at Stanley's
trial and was convicted . The court held that Hughes was rightly
--,!, See also F. Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation
of International Law ( 1952 ), 29 Brit . YrBk Int. L. 265, at p. 273 . It is
surprising that Lord Tenderten paid no heed to violations of international
latin.
00 O'Higgins, op . cit.. footnote 31, at pp . 283-284.
61 [1949) 1 All E.R . 373 (h .B . ) .
62 (18791, 4 Q .B .D . 614,
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convicted, notwithstanding . that there was . neither written information, nor oath to justify the issue of 'the warrant.
Leachinsky v. Christie 03 definitively established that an illegal arrest does not affect the -competence of the judge or the
jurisdiction of the court to deal with the case . The presence of the
offender is basically the original - starting point of any criminal
proceeding .
Canadian practice has adopted the same rule, as has been_
noted in the Hartnett" 4 case . It is of no relevance in the courts of
Canada that the accused has been brought illegally into the juris
diction. In R. v. Walton" the' court held that although the accused had been wrongfully arrested at Buffalo and forcibly brought
into Canada against his will and not under the provisions of the
Extradition Treaty in force between Canada and the United States
of America, this did -not impair the jurisdiction of the court to 'try
him. Rather it was the duty of -the court, once the accused was
within the jurisdiction, to make him amenable to justice. Basing its
findings in part on Ex parte Scott and Ker v. Illinois, the court .
held that the remedy for illegal arrest and kidnapping is by proceedings at the instance of the government whose territorial
sovereignty was violated, or at the suit of the injured party against
the individual or individuals who committed the'trespass to his
person .
.
Case law involving purely domestic situations supports the
same position . In R. v. Bourgeois''' it was held that if the accused
is present before the magistrate and the magistrate has jurisdic
tion over the offence charged,, he has jurisdiction to proceed
with the hearing no matter how illegal may have been the procedure which caused the accused to be before him. An improper
arrest does not fault the jurisdiction _of the magistrate . This proposition is supported by many other decisions including Ex parte
Giberson, 67 R. v. McDougall, Ex parte Goguen, 6 s R. v. BenoitU9
and more recently Re Regina and Groves .°
If one turns from criminal. cases to civil cases, one finds that
a party who is enticed into the state by fraud or force will not.
cs [19451 2 All B.R . 395, 61 T .L .R . 584 (C .A .) . See, also Christie v.
Leachinsky, [1947] A .C. 573 (H .L .) .
64 Supra, footnote 2 . ,
1,5 (1905), 10 C.C .C.' 269 (Ont . C .A .)_. .
e6 (1948), 92 C .C.C . 229 (N.B.C .A .) .
67 (1898), 34 N .B .R. 538 (C .A .) .
cs (1916), 35 D .L.R . 269 (N .B .) .
139 (1952), 105 C .C .C . 185 (Que .) .
70 (1972), 5 C .C .C. (2d) 90 (B .C.S .C .), and cases-cited therein .
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be subject to the jurisdiction of that state as the courts will
not be a party to any abuse of its own process. 7'
In the light of these precedents, the decision reached by the
Ontario High Court in Hartnett7 = is hardly surprising . The
applicants in that case argued that R . v. Isbell,-" to which one can
add all the other cases of that era, were decided before the
enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and thus today should
no longer be followed . This was not accepted by the Ontario
High Court. Had the applicants merely relied on the fact of
their arrest being unlawful, the court might have taken a more
enlightened approach T 4 and not relied on the heavy measure of
case law discussed above. They lost their case by merely asserting
that they were denied the right to be heard in extradition proceedings, a circumstance which in the view of the court did not
invalidate the process .75
In In re Johnson the court decided in part: 7'1
The law will not permit a person to be knidnapped or decoyed within
the jurisdiction for the purpose of being compelled to answer to a mere
private claim, but in criminal cases the interests of the public override
that which is, after all, a mere privilege from arrest .

71 Lewis v. Wiley (1923), 53 O.L .R . 608, at p. 609. In Lawrence v. Ward,
[19441 O.W .N . 199, [19441 2 D .L.R . 724, the defendant was not in Ontario
as the result of enticement or physical violence . He was a member of the
Canadian Navy, and although in Ontario under orders and not voluntarily,
he did not come within the qualifications expressed in Lelvis v. Wiley and
was not thus exempt from jurisdiction . See also Doyle v. Doyle (1974), 6
Nfld . & P.E .I .R . 110 (Nfld. S.C.) . In Watkins v. North American Land and
Timber Company (1904), 20 T.L .R . 534, the House of Lords dealt with the
service of a writ on the defendant who claimed he was enticed to enter the
jurisdiction of the court by fraud. The court decided that, had there been any
element of fraud, the service of the writ would have been set aside as an
abuse of process. However, it was found that the intention of the directors
of the plaintiff company was to discuss with,the defendant certain matters in
difference between them, There being no element of fraud, the defendant
was properly within the jurisdiction . Also Colt Industries v. Sarlie, [1966]
1 All E.R . 673 (Q.B .D .) . Here the defendant, domiciled in the United
States, visited London for a few days on business and was served there with
a writ . The court held that there was no fraud or enticement to induce the
defendant to come to England, and thus the writ was well founded. In the
United States of America see cases cited, supra, footnote 19 .
7 :S Supra, footnote 2.
7 .3 Supra, footnote 9.
74 However, note that in another context, the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada was not prepared to declare inadmissible, evidence obtained before the accused had an opportunity to consult his lawyer : Hogan
v. The Queen (1974), 48 D.L.R . (3d) 427 to be compared to Brownridge
v. The Queen (1972), 7 C.C .C . (2d) 417, 28 D.L.R . (3d) 1, [1972] S .C .R.
926.
75 No violation of the U.S .-Canada treaty was involved .
76 (1897), 167 U.S . 120, at p. 126.
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Beale also states that :

The effect of physical force, whether human force or vis major, should
be, on general principles, to nullify jurisdiction . . . . Where the defendant
was brought into the state by the unlawful use of force the court should
not exercise jurisdiction over him in a civil case . . . .

The underlying principle seems to be that the courts will
not allow a plaintiff to profit from underhand conduct. In United
States v. Cotten and Roberts, I s the appellants, relying on the anal
ogy of criminal to civil procedure, stated that as a court will not
exercise civil jurisdiction over a defendant brought into a state
by the unlawful force or fraud of the plaintiff, similarly a state
should not be permitted to benefit from the illegal activities of
its agents. In such case the court should exercise its discretionary
powers and refuse to sanction unreasonable . conduct by withholding jurisdiction .
The theory behind the courts' refusal to adopt the logic
of the above approach is that in a civil case the plaintiff who
uses fraud or violence is himself guilty of a misdemeanor. Yet
why should police conduct be whitewashed? In State v. Ross"
it was stated that : .

There is no fair analogy between civil and criminal cases in this respect .
In the one (civil) the party invoking the aid of the court is guilty of
fraud or violence in bringing the defendant . . . within the jurisdiction,
of the court . In the other (criminal) the people, the state, is guilty
of no wrong.

Even if one accepts the view that the state is a compact
entity, and that what the people or agents of the state do is done
by the staté itself, this has not prevented American courts from
excluding evidence secured by illegal searches, seizures and even
voluntary confessions when made while in unlawful police detention."" Thus, analogy between civil and criminal cases is not
totally irrelevant . One American authors' suggests that states
should refuse to sanction the trial of offenders whose presence
in the jurisdiction has been secured in breach of federal and
state kidnapping and extradition laws . However, he recognizes
that it may be difficult to achieve this result by a simple process
of statutory interpretation . He suggests that it would be better
to resort to common law rules which can be influenced by policy
~~ Conflict of Laws (1935), Vol . 1, p . 341 .
ss Supra, footnote 55, at p . 747 .
(1.866), 21 Iowa 467 .

sn McNabb v. United States (1943), 318 U .S . 332, 63 S . Ct 608, 87 L.

Ed . 819 .
81 See Scott, op . cit ., footnote 17, at p . 105 .
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considerations . `2 To prevent physical abductions and lawlessness
in toto which seems to be a valid objective in a democratic
society, the courts must refuse to try persons whose presence was
secured illegally . As indicated in the Toscanino case, this could
be done by interpreting due process more broadly and discarding
the Ker-Frisbie rule which has become outmoded. The criminal
procedure of a court is degraded when it is used against a
defendant who is the subject of a flagrant illegality.
One of the major problems raised by the present uncertain
tendencies of the law concerning unlawful arrest is the question of
policy . The interests of the individual offender are in juxtaposition
with those of the state. Canadian as well as American courts have
tended to promote the idea that illegality of some pre-trial events,
although infringing the accused's rights, should not nullify his
detention and excuse him from a crime he has committed . They
have weighed the illegal arrest against the merits of the criminal
charge . However, there is a conflicting theory as to the thought
that criminals should be punished, and that is that a government
should obey the law - even where criminals are concerned .
Jurisdiction gained through illegal acts tends to reward brutality
and lawlessness. Thus, one must consider whether it is in the
social interest to excuse a criminal because the police or government agents used illegal means to bring him before the court .e3
8= As to the common law duty to act fairly, that is judicially, in the context of a decision of an administration board, see the dissenting opinion of
Dickson J . in Howarth v . National Parole Board, Supreme Court of Canada,
October 11th, 1974, not yet reported .
ti 3 1n Hogan v . The Queen, .supra, footnote 74, Laskin J. (as he then
was) in a dissenting opinion, gives a good analysis of the social interest
involved in connection with the admissibility of illegally or improperly
obtained evidence . After noting that, in Canada, the choice of policy has
been to favour the social interest in the repression of crime despite the
unlawful invasion of individual interests and despite the fact that the invasion is by public officers charged with law enforcement, he comes to the
conclusion that "We would not be justified in simply ignoring the breach
of a declared fundamental right or in letting it go merely with words of
reprobation ." At pp . 442-443. His reasoning is equally applicable to illegal
arrest : "It may be said that the exclusion of relevant evidence is no way to
control illegal police practices and that such exclusion merely allows a
wrongdoer to escape conviction . Yet where constitutional guarantees are
concerned, the more pertinent consideration is whether those guarantees, as
fundamentals of the particular society, should be at the mercy of law
enforcement officers and a blind eye turned to their invasion because it is
more important to secure a conviction . The contention that it is the duty of
the Courts to get at the truth has in it too much of the philosophy of the
end justifying the means; it would equally challenge the present law as to
confessions and other out-of-Court statements by an accused ." Ibid .
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This trend of thought appears in a dissenting opinion of
Mr . Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States :a{
The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the
law in connection with the very transâction as to 'which he seeks legal
redress ., Then aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied
in order to maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in
the administration of justice ; in order to preserve, the judicial process
from contamination. . . .
Government officials should not have a separate set of rules
as regards their conduct. Respect for the authority of a government will seriously be affected if it fails itself to observe the law
faithfully, and individual citizens feel that their liberty is at
stake. A government should set an example to its people and
if it is known to be breaking the law in order to secure criminal
convictions what hope is there for society in general. The right
to be protected from abduction into the jurisdiction of a state
is a basic human right in a free society.sr, The misplaced sense
of justice on the part of governments or individual agents not'
to comply with legal machinery to bring offenders into the
jurisdiction of the court must be condemned .su The official who
acts in an unlawful way may be criminally liable for kidnapping .
He may also be liable civilly to the victim . for trespass to the
person . The criminal penalties are seldom used as there is no
tendency on the part of states to prosecute their officers, and as
regards the civil measures, there is little doubt that policemen
are not affluent enough to warrant action against them personally
unless their employers are made jointly liable ., 8' Thus, the most
definite way by far of deterring the police from wilful lawlessness
is to make it clear that criminals will not be tried who have
been illegally secured.ss,
The United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio 89 ,
interpreted the due process,clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
to require that the exclusionary rule be applied in, state as well
s} (1928), 277 U.S . 438, at pp . 484-485. Note that in Ex parte Brown,
supra, footnote 29, the court stated : "The criminal law, administered, as it
is for the protection of the whole people does not take cognizance of the
means by which illegal offenders are apprehended, so long as no act is done
which in itself is an infraction of the law.", at p, 656, italics mine .
s;) See, for instance, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1966, article 9, Brownlie, ed ., Basic Documents in International Law
(1967), pp . 153-154.
sa Would Canada allow the kidnapping on her territory of fugitives from
justice by agents of foreign-states?
87 See for instance Ontario Police Act, R,S .O ., 1970, c. 351, as am ., s. 24.
sa Scott, op . cit., footnote . 17, at p. 101.
89 Supra, footnote 16, at p. 646.
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as federal prosecutions . Thereafter evidence obtained by illegal
search or seizure could no longer be admitted in a state criminal
trial of a person from whom it was seized ."" If illegal seizures
and searches cannot be used in evidence as contrary to public
policy, this can surely be extended to prevent police kidnapping,
and to close the courts to the trial of an individual wrongly
brought into the jurisdiction.
As one author has put the problem succinctly :" 1
It seems that the courts have simply fallen into the habit of repeating,
parrot-like, that a court does not care how a defendant comes before
the court, without thinking whether such a rule is sound on principle .
In these days of low moral standards among public officials, both law
enforcement officers and others, it is especially important to re-establish
public respect for the law . This simply cannot be done if the very
people who enforce the law are themselves guilty of serious violations
of law. A rule of procedure which would forbid courts to try accused
persons who have been subjected to the type of lawless treatment covered in this article would help to resurrect something we seem to have
lost and which we badly need to find - a spirit of respect for law and
order .
In conclusion, it is obvious that the trend must be towards
a more even handed approach . Canadian courts should reconsider
their present position, as it is apparent that safeguards must be
provided for individuals against the over zealous agents of governments.
At the pre-trial stage, due process should cover more than
situations which could result in convicting an innocent person.
It should also be used as a means of deterring the police from
using methods that are offensive to the community's sense of
fair play and decency . The lessons and excellent reasoning of
Toscanino, even if the case involves some aspects of American
constitutional law peculiar to that country, should not be ignored
by Canadian courts if they are to follow Mr . Justice Martland's
opinion in Curr"- that the final word"-' has not yet been said
9 " See also Silverthorne Lumber Co . v. United States (1920), 251 U.S .
385, per Holmes J ., at p . 392. This case involved the Fourth Amendment to

the U .S . Constitution which denounces unreasonable searches and seizures.
In Hobson v. Crouse (1964), 332 F. 2d 561 (10th Cir .), the Court of
Appeals was of the opinion that the Ker-Frisbie rule had not been overruled
by Mapp v. Ohio.
yt Scott, op . cit., footnote 17, at p . 107.
9-

Supra, footnote 4 .

In the light of the majority opinion in Hodge v. The Queen, supra.
footnote 74, this might prove to be difficult . In Rex v. Bottley (1929), 51
C.C.C . 384 (Alta C.A .), Harvey C .J .A . said at p . 387 : ". . .the objection
93
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as to the meaning of our due process of law . 14
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is in reality not one to jurisdiction in the ordinary sense but rests rather
on the `disregard of the forms of legal process or by some violation of the
principles of natural justice' in the words of Viscount Cave L.C ., in Rex v.
Nadan, [1926] 2 D.L .R . 177, at p. 184, 45 C.C .C . 221, at p. 229" .
94 Should s. 1(a) of the Bill of Rights be applicable to the type of
conduct referred to in this comment, there would still remain the question
whether the Bill can be given extraterritorial application to the conduct
abroad of Canadian officials directed against Canadian citizens and residents . In the U.S .A . this has been answered in the affirmative . See Balzac v.
Puerto Rico (1922), 258 U.S . 298, at pp . 312-313 : "The Constitution of
the United States is in force . . . whenever and wherever the sovereign
power of that government is exerted." The constitution applies only to the
conduct abroad of agents acting on behalf of the United States and not
that of foreign officials in their own country. Birdsell v. United States
(1965), 346 F. 2d 775, at p. 782 (5th Cir.), cert . den. 382 U.S . 963 .
Sharon A. Williams, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Toronto.

